ABSTRACT Most of the existing blind proxy re-signature schemes are designed based on the traditional public key cryptosystems, whose security relies on the hardness of big integer factoring, discrete logarithm, elliptic curve discrete logarithm, and so on. However, these problems will be unsecure when facing the attack of quantum computers. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a blind proxy re-signature scheme based on the problem of isomorphisms of polynomials, which can resist quantum attack, and gave its security proof under the random oracle model. In the proposed scheme, the message can be kept blind by using the hash function, and the delegatee's identity can be kept anonymous by using the problem of isomorphisms of polynomials. Compared with the existing schemes, the new scheme has more secure properties, such as quantum resistance, high efficiency, message blindness, and delegatee anonymity. It is concluded that the proposed scheme has a good application prospect in the future quantum computing environment with low-power hardware.
I. INTRODUCTION
The digital signature has become an indispensable part in the field of the network security, because it has the function of ensuring the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation of the sender's information. According to the different application scenarios, various types of digital signature schemes were put forward, such as proxy signature [1] , group signature [2] , multi-signature [3] , and transitive signature [4] . Since Blaze et al. [5] proposed the proxy re-signature in Eurocrypt in 1998, the proxy re-signature [5] has become a new branch in the field of the digital signature technology. In the proxy re-signature scheme, the semi-trusted proxy signer transforms the delegatee Alice's signature on a message into the delegator Bob's signature on the same message. Different from proxy signatures, proxy re-signatures require that proxy signers be unable to sign on behalf of Alice or Bob on their own. Therefore, proxy re-signatures focus on securely implementing the delegation of signature without fully trusting the proxy signer, and they play an important role in the space-efficient proof, transparent certification, managing group signatures, and sharing and conversion of digital certificate.
The proxy re-signature scheme proposed by Blaze et al. [5] realized a semi-trusted proxy signer. In 2005, Ateniese and Hohenberger [6] proposed a new definition for properties and applications of the proxy re-signature. They pointed out the defect of the previous schemes and put forward a more secure proxy re-signature scheme by exploiting bilinear maps. The security of their scheme was based on CDH (Computational Daffier-Hellman) and 2-DL (2-Discrete Logarithm). At the same time, they formally defined the algorithm and security model of the proxy re-signature. Since then, many proxy resignature schemes with different properties have been put forward. In 2007, Shao et al. [7] proposed a new proxy resignature scheme based on Water's signature scheme [8] . In this scheme, the correctness of the re-signature transformation was ensured by the property of the bilinear maps and the security of Shao et al. ' s scheme relied on the CDH assumption. In 2008, Libert and Vergnaud [9] proposed a proxy re-signature scheme with the construction of two-level signature, which can improve the security of proxy signer's re-signature key. In this scheme, the proxy signer used the first level signature to verify and translate signatures and used the second level signature as the translated signature after the re-sign. This scheme was more secure than Shao's scheme [7] because of Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumption, but it caused a problem of large computation and storage costs. In 2012, Vivik et al. [10] proposed a more secure proxy re-signature scheme with two-level signature based on the CDH assumption. In the process of signing and re-signing of this scheme, they used the combination of exponentiation and hash function to make the scheme more secure, but it also caused the large computation and storage costs. In 2015, Wang [11] proposed a new proxy re-signature scheme supporting conditional delegation based on Water's signature scheme [8] . In this scheme, the delegatee can decide whether to authorize the proxy signer to translate the signature by altering the random number in the process of the generation of re-signature key.
In order to satisfy more application scenarios, the study of the proxy re-signature is not only restricted to the proxy re-signature algorithm, but also combines proxy re-signature algorithm and other algorithms according to the requirements of the different properties over the past decade. For example, the certificateless proxy re-signature scheme [12] is the combination of the certificateless cryptography and the proxy resignature, and the threshold proxy re-signature scheme [13] is the combination of the threshold signature and the proxy re-signature. The blind proxy re-signature technology combined proxy re-signature with blind signature technology, which has become a new field of proxy re-signature research because of its good application prospect. The blind signature was proposed by Chaum [14] in 1982, which is a digital signature technology with the property of information hiding. In 2010, Deng et al. [15] put forward the definition of the blind proxy re-signature through combining the message blindness and the proxy re-signature. In the blind proxy re-signature scheme, the proxy signer cannot get the correct message in the process of re-signing. Therefore it is suitable for the occasions that need to hide the signed message. The blind re-signature scheme uses the bilinear mapping computation in the process of signature blinding and unblinding, which ensures the message blindness and the correctness of this scheme.
So far, almost all blind proxy re-signature schemes are designed based on the traditional public key cryptography, whose security relies on the problems of integer factorization, discrete logarithm and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems, etc..Nevertheless, Shor's theory [16] points out that the quantum computer could easily solve the hard problems of prime factorization, discrete logarithm and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm, etc.. Hence, the security of current blind proxy re-signature schemes is threatened by the quantum computer. In addition, the identity protection of delegates is not considered in the existing blind proxy re-signature schemes, that is, the existing schemes do not take into account the delegatee's anonymity, so it is necessary to study the new quantum resistant blind proxy re-signature schemes. In 2012, Tang and Xu [17] proposed a simple and efficient signature scheme based on IP(Isomorphism of Polynomials)assumption, which can resist the quantum computing attack. For the sake of convenience, we call it IP signature scheme in this paper. This scheme gives a good idea for designing quantum resistant signature, and enlightens us to construct quantum resistant blind proxy re-signature schemes.
OUR CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we propose a new blind proxy re-signature scheme based on IP signature [17] . By using the hash function and Isomorphisms of Polynomials problem, our scheme is with message blindness and delegatee anonymity. In the process of the re-signature translation of our scheme, the proxy signer cannot get the correct message and the identity of delegatee, which is conducive to protecting the user privacy in the re-signing process. Therefore, our scheme is with the properties of quantum resistance, high efficiency, message blindness and delegatee's anonymity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we introduce the preliminaries of blind proxy re-signature scheme. In section III, we describe the concrete algorithms of the proposed scheme. In section IV, we analyze the correctness of the proposed scheme. In section V, we give the security proof of our scheme. We analyze the properties and efficiency of the proposed scheme in section VI. In section VII, we summarize our work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
First of all, we briefly introduce the definition of the affine transformation, the Isomorphism of Polynomials and the general structure model of blind proxy re-signature scheme.
A. AFFINE TRANSFORMATION
The reversible affine transformation is a linear transformation. In a multivariable public key cryptosystem, the reversible affine transformation can be used to hide the central mapping quadratic polynomial in the multivariable public key cryptosystem by transforming the input and output of the central mapping.
Definition 1: Reversible affine transformation. Let S i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) be n polynomials over a finite field F q , where n is a positive integer and q is a prime, and we have
, and x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is a vector over F q . S is a reversible affine transformation.
Given a fixed value
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B. PROBLEM OF ISOMOPHISM OF POLYNOMIALS
Patarin illustrated the IP (Isomorphism of Polynomials) problem in [18] , namely Polynomial Isomorphism problem. All operations are on the finite field F q . Let u and n be positive integers, and A be a set of u quadratic equations in formula (1) with n variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n .
B is a set of u quadratic equations in formula (2) with n variables x 1 , . . . , x n :
S is a bijective affine transformation with u variables y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y u , which can be denoted as follows:
T is a bijective affine transformation with n variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , which can be denoted as follows:
Sign: With the message m and the private key sk as inputs, the signature algorithm (Sign) outputs the signature V on m.
Verify: Taking as input the public key pk, a message m and the signature V on m, the Verify algorithm judges whether Verify(m, V , pk) = 1 holds. If signatures generated by the algorithms Sign and ReSign make Verify(m, V , pk) = 1 true, the blind proxy re-signature scheme is correct.
SignBlind: With the message m, Alice's public key pk a and Alice's signature V a on m as inputs, if Verify(m, V a , pk a ) = 1 is true, the blind signature algorithm (SignBlind) blinds the message m and signature V a , and outputs the blinded signature V a , the blinded message ε and the blinded public keys pk a of the delegatee.
ReSign: Taking as input the re-signature key by re-signature key generation algorithm, a blinded message ε, the blinded public key pk a of the delegatee and the blinded signature V a on ε, if Verify(ε, V a , pk a ) = 1 is true, the resignature generation algorithm (ReSign) will be done and outputs the signature V b which is the blinded delegator Bob's signature. Otherwise, outputs ⊥.
ReSignUnblind: With the blinded re-signature V b and message m as input, the unblind re-signature algorithm (ReSignUnBlind) outputs the unblended re-signature V b and judges whether Verify(m, V b , pk b ) = 1 holds. If the equation is true, the algorithm outputs the unblended re-signature V b . Otherwise, outputs ⊥.
D. BLIND PROXY RE-SINGNATURE SECURITY MODLE ON THE RANDOM ORACLES
The blind proxy re-signature scheme based on Isomorphism of Polynomials is unforgeable under the chosen message attack if there is no polynomial bounded adversary A to win the game with a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
The proxy re-signature security game is played by the attacker A and the challenger C as follows:
1) ORACLE QUERIES
The attacker A's queries will be tackled with as follows.
O KeyGen : Key Generation Oracle. In the query, A inputs a public key pk generated by key generation algorithm (KeyGen), and the oracle O KeyGen outputs the signer's private key sk to A.
O ReKey : Re-Signature Key Oracle. In the query, A inputs public keys pk a and pk b generated by key generation algorithm (KeyGen), and the oracle O ReKey outputs the re-signature key rk a→b to A.
O Sign : Signature Oracle. In the query, A inputs a public key pk generated by key generation algorithm (KeyGen) and arbitrary message m in the message space, and the oracle O Sign outputs the signature V to A, which can be verified by public key pk.
O ReSign : Blind Proxy Re-Signature Oracle. In the query, A inputs (pk a , pk b , σ , V a ), where pk a and pk b are public key generated by key generation algorithm (KeyGen), and V a is a signature on the blinded message σ which can be verified by public key pk a , and the oracle O ReSign outputs the signature V b to A. If the final outputs of A satisfy the above conditions, we say A wins the game and define the advantage of A in the above game to be Adv A .
2) FORGERY

III. BLIND PROXY RE-SIGNAURE SCHEME BASED ON ISOMORPHISMS OF POLYNOMIALS
Our scheme consists of the following eight algorithms: Global-Setup, KeyGen, ReKey, Sign, SignBlind, ReSign, ReSignUnblind and Verify. There are five entities in this scheme, that is, the delegatee Alice, the delegator Bob, the proxy signer, the blinding proxy signer and a system administrator.
A. GLOBAL-SETUP ALGORITHM
The administrator runs this algorithm to generate the global system parameters (n, u, q 1 , q 2 , q, K , Q, H 1 (x), H 2 (x)). The specific steps are as follows: 1) Let K be a finite field of order 2 p , where p is a positive integer selected by the system. Let n, u, q 1 , q 2 and q be positive integers, and q 1 and q 2 satisfy the equation
3) Let Q be a set of u quadratic polynomial equations in the equation (5) with n variables:
where x i and x j are defined as the variables of polynomial equations, γ ijk is defined as the coefficient of the quadratic terms of polynomial equations, µ ik is defined as the first-order coefficient of polynomial equations, and δ k is defined as the constant term. 4) The administrator publishes the global system parame-
B. KEYGEN ALGORITHM
The user V runs this algorithm to generate keys by selecting his (or her) own parameters, and the details are as follows: 1) V randomly selects a pair of reversible affine transformations (M v , N v ), which are in the following form:
where M v is a reversible affine transformation with u variables, and N v is a reversible affine transformation with n variables. By using (M v , N v ), V can compute her part public key A v as follows:
2) V randomly selects reversible affine transformations
as her/his private key, which is in the following form:
where S v is defined as a reversible affine transformation with u variables, and T v is defined as a reversible affine transformation with n variables. By using (S v , T v ), V can compute her/his another part public key B v as follows:
3) Through the above steps 1) and 2), V gets her/his public key pk v = (A v , B v ). By using the above steps, Alice chooses randomly her private key sk a = (S a , T a ), and compute her public key pk a = (A a , B a ). In the same way, Bob randomly selects reversible affine transformations sk b = (S b , T b ) as his private key, and compute his public key pk b = (A b , B b ).
C. REKEY ALGORITHM
The proxy signer runs this algorithm to generate the resignature key rk a→b = (rk 1 , rk 2 , rk 3 , rk 4 ).
1) The proxy signer randomly selects reversible affine transformations C, D, E and F, and sends them to Alice. Alice computes
Where C and E are defined in the equation (3), D and F are defined in the equation (4). 
where the ''−1'' is an inverse operation. After computing, Bob sends Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 and Z 4 to the proxy signer.
3) After receiving Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 and Z 4 , the proxy signer computes
4) The proxy signer obtains the re-signature key (rk 1 , rk 2 ,
D. SIGN ALGORITHM
The delegatee Alice runs Sign algorithm to generate the signature which can be verified by her public key. This signature generation algorithm (Sign) is based on the IP signature scheme.
1) Alice inputs the parameters m, (A a , B a ), (S a , T a ), where m is the message, in the implementation the message m plus redundancy will be represented as a vector m = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ) over K , which will be assigned to the variables of polynomial equations used in the Sign algorithm; (A a , B a ) is the pair of public key, and (S a , T a ) is the pair of private key. 2) Alice randomly selects the following q bijective affine transformation pairs ((S 1 , T 1 ), (S 2 , T 2 ), . . . , (S q , T q )), which can be used only once.
2 , . . . , y
. . , x n ). 3) By using the above results in step 2, Alice computes
. . . ,
where the '' '' means the concatenation operation. 5) Alice computes the value of (S i , T i )
where H [i] is the binary value of the i-th bit of H and the order of the binary string takes from the low-order to the high-order. 6) Alice computes the signature V a on the message m as follows:
Finally, Alice sends m, V a and pk a = (A a , B a ) to the blinding proxy signer.
E. SIGNBLIND ALGORITHM
Taking as input m, V a and pk a = (A a , B a ), the blinding proxy signer runs this algorithm to generate the blinded signature as follows. 1) First, the blinding proxy signer computes
2) Then, the blinding proxy signer computes H = H 1 (m) H 2 (C 1 C 2 . . . C q ), and check whether H = H holds. If H = H holds, the signature is true. And the blinding proxy signer executes the next step. Otherwise, the signature verification is false. And the blinding proxy signer returns ⊥ and aborts the algorithm. 3) The blinding proxy signer selects M * and N * as follows:
4) By using M * and N * , the blinding proxy signer computes the following values:
Then, the blinding proxy signer computes
6) By using the above results, the blinding proxy signer computes and outputs the blinded signature
) of Alice, the blinded message ε = H 1 (m) and Alice's blinded public key pk * a = (A * , B * ). VOLUME 6, 2018
F. RESIGN ALGORITHM
Take as input V * , ε = H 1 (m), pk * a = (A * , B * ) and the resignature key rk a→b = (rk 1 , rk 2 , rk 3 , rk 4 ), the proxy signer runs this algorithm to generate the blinded re-signature as follows.
1) The proxy signer computes
2) The proxy signer checks whether H = H holds. If H = H holds, the signature is true. And the proxy signer executes the next step. Otherwise, the signature verification is false. And the proxy signer returns ⊥ and aborts the algorithm.
3) The proxy signer generates the re-signature by computing
4) The proxy signer outputs the blinded re-signature
G. RESINGUNBLIND ALGORITHM
Take as input the blinded re-signature V * b , M * , N * , and (E * i , F * i ), the blinding proxy signer runs this algorithm to generate the re-signature.
1) The blinding proxy signer computes
2) The blinding proxy signer computes 
If H b = H , the signature is true, and the algorithm runs successfully. Otherwise, the signature verification is false, and return ⊥.
IV. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove our scheme is correct from the following three parts: the correctness of SignBlind, the correctness of ReSignUnblind and the correctness of ReSign.
A. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS OF SIGNBLIND
Theorem 1: The SignBlind algorithm of the blind proxy resignature scheme based on Isomorphisms of Polynomials is correct. If the SignBlind algorithm is correct, the scheme must satisfy the conditions as follows. For arbitrary message m, the blinded message ε = H 1 (m) and Alice's blinded public key pk * a = (A * , B * ), the signature V * generated by SignBlind are satisfied with Verify(ε, V * , (A * , B * )) = 1.
Proof: The blinding proxy signer runs SignBlind to generate the blinded signature
SignBlind generates Alice's blinded public key as
The blinding proxy signer computes:
From the above two equations, we have
If
According to the Sign algorithm, we have the following equations:
So, we can get
We can get H * = H . It satisfies with Verify (m, V * , (A * , B * )) = 1.
Therefore, the SignBlind algorithm is correct.
B. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS OF RESIGNUNBLIND
Theorem 2: The ReSignUnblind algorithm of the blind proxy re-signature scheme based on Isomorphisms of Polynomials is correct. If the ReSignUnblind algorithm is correct, the scheme must satisfy the conditions as follows. For arbitrary message m, and Bob's public keys pk b = (A b , B b ) by KeyGen, the signature V b generated by ReSignUnblind are satisfied with
The blinding proxy signer runs ReSignUnblind to generate the unblinded signature
From the above equations, we have
According to the ReSignUnblind algorithm, we have
According to the ReSign algorithm, we have
According to the ReKey algorithm, we have
. . , q, we can get:
In the signature transformed by the blinding proxy signer, the q reversible affine transformation pairs can be regarded as the affine transformation pairs chosen by Bob. Those are
According to the KeyGen algorithm, we have
For the same message m, we can get
Therefore, the ReSignUnblind algorithm is correct. Proof: We first prove that the signature V i generated by Sign is satisfied with Verify(m,
C. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS OF RESIGN
Alice randomly selects q'reversible affine transformation pairs ((S 1 , T 1 ), (S 2 , T 2 ), . . . , (S q , T q )), according to the Sign and KeyGen algorithms, we have
According to the Sign algorithm and KeyGen algorithms, we have
where H [i] is the value of the i-th bit of H .
Hence, the signature V a generated by Sign is satisfied with Verify(m, V a , (A a , B a ) 
Then, we prove that the signature generated by ReSign is satisfied with Verify(m, ReSignUnblind(ReSign
By the theorem 1 and the theorem 2, we can get ReSignUnblind(ReSign(rk a→b , m, V a )) = V b .
By the theorem 2, we can get
According to the theorem 2, we have
According to the ReSignUnblind and ReSign algorithms, when H [i] = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , q, we have: VOLUME 6, 2018 and when H [i] = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , q, we have:
Hence, The signature generated by ReSign is satisfied with Verify(m, ReSignUnblind (ReSign(rk a→b , m, V a ) 
Therefore, the ReSign algorithm is correct. By the analysis above, our scheme is proved.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove our scheme is secure from the following two parts: consistency and unforgeability. In the proposed scheme, we assume that the proxy signer cannot collude with the delegatee Alice or the delegator Bob.
A. ANALYSIS OF CONSISTENCY
Theorem 4:
The blind proxy re-signature scheme based on Isomorphisms of Polynomials is consistent. If the scheme is consistent, the blind proxy re-signature scheme must satisfy the condition that for an arbitrary message m, the public key pk i = (A i , B i ) and the signature V i , the results of respectively running the algorithm Verify(m, V i , (A i , B i ) ) twice are the same.
Proof: In our scheme, when the signature generated by Sign(pk i , m) or Resign(rk i→j , m, V i ) is verified, the same conditions are used. So we can get that H is always equal to
Therefore, the blind proxy re-signature scheme is consistent.
B. ANALYSIS OF UNFORGEABILITY
Theorem 5:
Under the random oracle model, if the adversary A with a non-negligible probability ε wins the game at most Q S times queries to the oracle O Sign , Q K times queries to the oracle O KeyGen , Q RK times queries to the oracle O ReKey , Q RS times queries to the oracle O ReSign , Q H 1 times hash queries to the oracle H 1 , and Q H 2 times hash queries to the oracle H 2 , then there may exist an algorithm C which is able to solve the IP problem with a probability ε in the polynomial time,
.
Proof: Let (S t , T t ) be the target private keys of algorithm C, A is a subroutine of C, and C also plays the role of the challenger in the game.
1) INITIALIZATION PHASE
Set the public parameters (n, u, q 1 , q 2 , K , Q) of adversary A, where K is a finite field, n, u, q 1 and q 2 are positive integers, Q is a set of u quadratic equations with n variables. Let H 1 (•) : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} q 1 , H 2 (•) : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} q 2 be random oracles.
2) ATTACK PHASE
O KeyGen : Challenger C chooses (S i , T i ) at random. If there is not the entry, output the corresponding value (pk i , sk i ) = (A i , B i ) , where
and S i is defined in the equation (3), N i and T i is defined in the equation (4) . If there is the entry, output the corresponding public keys and private keys (pk i ,
O Sign : Take as input (pk i , m j ) after C receiving A's querying, challenger C chooses S p , T p at random, p = 1, 2, . . . , q.
(a) If pk i has been compromised, compute
The signer computes H and (S p , T p ) as follows:
If pk i has not been compromised, select M defined in the equation (3) and N defined in the equation (4) and compute
Then, the signer computes the hash value H = H 1 (m) H 2 (C 1 C 2 . . . C q ) and (S p , T p ), and
The verification process of signature correctness is as follows if pk i is not been compromised.
First compute:
O ReKey : Take as input (pk i , pk j ) after C receiving A's querying, challenger C outputs rk i→j (rk 1 , rk 2 , rk 3 , rk 4 
when pk i and pk j are both compromised or not. Otherwise, ends the program.
O ReSign : Take as input (pk a , pk b , σ , V a ) after C receiving A's querying, where pk a = pk a , V a is the blinded signature of the blinded message σ corresponding to the public key pk a . The challenger C verifies Verify(pk a , σ, V a ) = 1, if Verify(pk a , σ, V a ) = 1 and pk a = pk a , C outputs O Sign (pk b , m j ) by running O Sign . Otherwise, ends the program.
O H 1 : Take as input m k after C receiving A s querying, there is the entry in the list L 1 , challenger C outputs the corresponding value; otherwise, C chooses ω ∈ Z q 1 at random and records it in the list L 1 .
O H 2 : Take as input (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C q ) after C receiving A s querying, there is the entry in the list L 2 , challenger C outputs the corresponding value; otherwise, C chooses µ ∈ Z q 2 at random and records it in the list L 2 .
3) FORGERY PHASE
A outputs a purposed forgery V = (H , (S 1 , T 1 ), (S 2 , T 2 ), . . . , (S q , T q )) after the polynomial bounded time queries.
According to the analysis above, we know the simulation is equal to the actual attack environment. If the forgery of A succeeds, A must obtain (S t , T t ). The probability of obtaining the correct (S t , T t ) is 1 Q RS +Q S at least, and (S t , T t ) is as the C's output for IP problem.
The probability that A will guess the target user correctly is 1 Q K . The probability that A will guess the correct message
Thus, the probability that C succeeds is
VI. EFFICIENCY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
The proposed scheme has quite low time consumption throughout the algorithm. The time consumption mainly includes the stage of re-signature generation (including the algorithms of ReSign, SignBlind, and ReSignUnblind in the proposed scheme) and the stage of verification. The following table shows the efficiency of our scheme by analyzing the time consumption of the stage of re-signature generation and verification between existing proxy re-signature schemes and ours. Exponentiation operations and pairing operations are inefficient [19] . According to Pang et al.'s data (see PlosOne, 2016, 11(11) : e0166173), compared with the time consumption T m of a modular multiplication operation, the time consumptions of exponentiation operation, pairing operation and hash operation are T p ≈ 87T m , T e ≈ 43.5T m , T h ≈ 29T m , respectively. From Table 1 , we can see that there is no exponentiation operation and pairing operation in the stage of re-signature generation in our proxy re-signature scheme. So our scheme uses the hash operation with little computation to substitute the pairing operation and exponentiation operation of the scheme [15] in the algorithms of SignBlind, and ReSignUnblind. Therefore, our scheme is more efficient compared with other schemes [6] , [7] , [9] - [11] , [15] .
According to the analysis of the attack for IP signature scheme [17] , the attack computational complexity is over 280 that required by the security level, where the parameters are K = GF(28), n = 18, u = 10, and q = 64. In our scheme, the size of public key is 8u(n + 1)(n + 2) = 8 * 10 * (18 + 1) * (18 + 2) = 30400(bits), and the size of private key is 8u(u + 1)+n(n+1) = 8 * 10 * (10+1)+8 * 18 * (18+1) = 3616(bits). Because other schemes [6] , [7] , [9] - [11] , [15] are based on the discrete logarithm problems and p, q are prime numbers, the size of public key and private key is 1024 bits. Therefore, compared with other schemes [6] , [7] , [9] - [11] , [15] , our scheme is large in the size of the public key and private key, which is the inherent defect of IP signature technology, and requires further study.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Although the size of public key and private key of our scheme is large, it has more secure properties. The following table compares the secure properties between the existing proxy re-signature schemes and ours.
According to table 2, we briefly analyze these properties.
1) MULTI-USE
The signature generated by ReSignUnblind or Sign of the blind proxy re-signature scheme can be used as input to the ReSign algorithm. In our scheme, the type of ReSignUnblind algorithm input is
. And the type of the signature generated by ReSignUnblind is V b = (H , (S 1b , T 1b ), (S 2b , T 2b ) , . . . , (S qb , T qb )). The type of the signature generated by Sign is V a = (H , (S 1 , T 1 ), (S 2 , T 2 ), . . . , (S q , T q )). These three signature types are exactly the same. Therefore, the signature can be retransformed again by the proxy signer. Therefore, our scheme is multi-use.
2) TRANSPARENT
In a transparent scheme, users can not judge the signature is generated by ReSignUnblind or Sign. Because the type of the signature generated by ReSignUnblind and Sign are the same, (H , (S 1 , T 1 ), (S 2 , T 2 ), . . . , (S q , T q )). Therefore, our scheme is transparent.
3) MESSAGE BLINDNESS
If the proxy signer cannot get the message m in a blind proxy re-signature scheme, the scheme is message blindness.
In the SignBlind algorithm of our scheme, the blinding proxy signer runs hash operation on the message m. He sends the blinded message ε = H 1 (m) to the proxy signer. Because of the unidirectional of the hash operation, the proxy signer cannot get the message m from the blinded message ε. Therefore, our scheme is message blindness.
4) DELEGATEE ANONYMITY
If the proxy signer cannot get the public key of delegatee in a blind proxy re-signature scheme, the scheme is delegatee anonymity.
In the SignBlind algorithm of our scheme, the blinding proxy signer selects M * and N * as follows:
The blinding proxy signer computes
The blinding proxy signer outputs the pair of blinded Alice's public keys pk * a = (A * , B * ). If the proxy signer wants to get the public key of the delegatee pk a = (A a , B a ) , he must solve the equation as If the proxy signer wants to get (S a , T a ), he must first get (M * −1
•S a , T a •N * −1 ). The difficulty of solving this problem is same with solving the IP problem.
Due to the difficulty of the IP problem, the proxy signer cannot get the public key of the delegatee. Therefore, the scheme is delegatee anonymity.
5) QUANTUM RESISTANCE
According to the analysis of the attack for the multivariate public key cryptosystem, the proposed scheme can resist quantum attack if the computational complexity of the attack to signature is over 2 80 .
Our scheme is based on the multivariate public key cryptosystem. According to the analysis of the attack for IP signature scheme [17] , the attack computational complexity is over 2 80 that required by the security level, where the parameters are K = GF(2 8 ), n = 18, u = 10, and q = 64. Therefore, the scheme can resist quantum attack.
6) SECURITY MODEL
We list the based security model of all schemes in the comparison. Schemes [7] , [9] , [10] , [15] are secure in the standard model (SM). Our scheme and schemes [6] , [11] are secure in the Random oracle model (ROM). In the standard model, the adversary is only limited by the amount of time and computational power available and there is no other assumption. Security proofs are notoriously difficult to achieve in the standard model, so in many practices, cryptographic primitives are replaced by the random oracle model. In addition, the scheme based on ROM is more efficient.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a blind proxy re-signature scheme based on Isomorphisms of Polynomials in the multivariate public key cryptosystems. We proved our scheme is correct, consistent and unforgeable. Meanwhile, our scheme is with the properties of multi-use, transparency, message blindness, delegatee anonymity, and quantum resistance. Therefore, it has more advantages of safety and efficiency in the lowpower hardware and the environment under quantum computers attack. However, compared with the existing schemes, our scheme is large in the size of public key and private key, which is the inherent defect of the multivariate public key cryptosystems. Hence, we will focus on the blind proxy re-signature scheme based on the multivariate public key cryptosystems with smaller size of key in the future work. 
